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1 Written  before  the  launch  of  Barack  Obama’s  reform  campaign,  this  history  of
presidential  leadership in health policy making is  a timely addition to the large and
growing number of publications about the evolution of the U.S. health care debate, and
puts the current initiative in historical perspective. James Morone is the former editor of
the Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law, the author of numerous articles on health care
politics and policy,  and editor,  with Lawrence Jacobs,  of  Healthy,  Wealthy and Fair,  an
acclaimed analysis of the inequities that plague the American health care system and
their consequences. David Blumenthal, a Professor of Medicine and Health Care Policy at
Harvard Medical School, was one of the main advisers to the Obama campaign. He was
named National Coordinator for Health Information Technology in March 2009 to oversee
the implementation of what the new administration sees as a crucial tool to improve
efficiency and reduce costs within an overhauled health care system.
2 Based on recently released presidential archives and tapes, as well as interviews with key
players in health care policymaking, The Heart of Power provides a fresh angle from which
to view the American presidency, American institutions, and the evolution of health care
policy. If Roosevelt’s struggle with polio, Nixon’s psychological problems, and Reagan’s
age-related problems are well-known, Eisenhower’s stroke and Johnson’s heart problems
have attracted less public attention but still deserve the interest shown by Morone and
Blumenthal in their masterful analysis of the unique role of the president in health care
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policy. The authors’ original approach links the personal and the political by showing
how the presidents’ medical histories and their relations to illness and medicine (through
their occasional battles with ill health or the suffering or death of a loved one) shaped
their relationships with one of the most intractable domestic policy issues. Morone and
Blumenthal thus succeed in lending a human touch to conservative figures such as Nixon,
Reagan, or George W. Bush. They revisit the role of Republican presidents whose health
policy approaches are explained and were softened, and sometimes corrected, by their
personal histories.
3 The  Heart  of  Power also  provides  fascinating  insights  into  the  changing  political,
institutional, and societal environment in which presidents have exercised their function,
one  which  has  seen  the  rise  of  conservatism,  Congress’  increasing  polarization,  the
ascendancy of economists, and the growing importance of the media.
4 “No president can escape the issue and almost none can successful  manage it.”(130).
Health care reform is a test of the president’s skill and determination to produce bold
ideas and translate them into legislation by playing the insider game, navigating the
pitfalls of the American system of government and using the bully pulpit to rally the
nation behind his vision. In the area of domestic policy, more than any other issue, it has
become the standard by which a successful, modern presidency is measured. The book
also demonstrates the courage it takes for a president to commit political capital to an
issue that carries enormous political risks for uncertain rewards, and it throws into stark
relief the magnitude of the task upon which Barack Obama has staked his presidency.
5 This history of presidential health policy making, which spans the seven decades and
eleven  presidents  from  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  to  George  W.  Bush,  takes  us  through
successive cycles of social policy, from the New-Deal Era with its faith in the power of
government to act for the public good, to the last decade of the 20th century, which saw
the Democrats abandon the Social Security model and shift to market-based reforms. In
their  quest  for  the  keys  to  success,  the  authors  debunk  a  few  myths,  and  in  their
conclusion they draw the lessons of presidential successes and failures by means of a list
of eight principles that might serve as a toolbox to help the next president handle the
unfinished business of the New Deal.
6 Most of their suggestions are inspired by the true story of Medicare they claim to reveal,
as  well  as  by the successful  way Lyndon Johnson manoeuvred Congress  into passing
legislation he  was  passionately  committed  to.  In  one  of  the  book’s  most  enthralling
chapters,  which  illustrates  Johnson’s  preference  for  domestic  policy  issues  and  his
superior efficiency in dealing with them, the authors pay a vibrant tribute to “the most
important health care president the U.S. has ever had.” Based on information unearthed
from White-House tapes and interviews, they give Johnson his due as the main player
behind the passage of Medicare. The chapter offers a fascinating account of a clash of
titans: Johnson, the fervent New Dealer and arch progressive, was determined to cajole
Wilbur Mills, the powerful conservative chair of the House Ways and Means Committee,
into adopting a bill that would fulfil Kennedy’s unfinished agenda. Although historians
generally agree that Mills was the architect of the legislation, Morone and Blumenthal
demonstrate that it was Johnson who masterminded it and pushed it through Congress
through  an  adroit  combination  of  coaxing,  threatening,  and  above  all,  relentless
persistence.  The  chapter  reads  like  a  textbook  illustration  of  what  it  takes  for
groundbreaking, divisive legislation to be passed: presidential passion and commitment,
speed, the ability to manage Congress and give it credit for success, and a willingness to
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put political goals ahead of economic concerns. In the rest of the book, the authors keep
hammering home this formula for legislative victory. 
7 This enthusiastic account of Johnson’s health policy skills sidesteps a conundrum that has
bedevilled historians for decades: why didn’t he use his tremendous political gifts to push
for  national  health  insurance?  If  the  1965  amendments  to  the  Social  Security  Act
represented “the  single  most  important  piece  of  health  care  legislation in  American
history,” they also undercut later efforts at achieving the liberals’ dream of universal
coverage, pushing it into the realm of the politically unfeasible.
8 Although the issue is in theory owned by the Democrats, another lesson of this analysis of
presidential leadership in health care policy is that Republicans have also significantly
contributed to shaping the system and inspiring reforms which sometimes expanded, or
aimed  at  expanding,  a  welfare  state  that  they  excoriated.  Democrats  won  the  most
spectacular success with the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, but they also experienced
the most resounding failure (Clinton's health Security Act). One unexpected conclusion of
this remarkable series of portraits is that Republican presidents were, for political but
also deeply personal reasons, interested in health care policy issues and quite effective at
handling them, sometimes in opposition to their own party’s line. Thus the Eisenhower
presidency firmly established the foundations of America’s public/private health care
system  with  the  tax  exemption  of  employer  and  employee  contributions  to  health
insurance  premiums.  It  was  under  Reagan,  a  president  who blamed government  for
society’s problems and was a fervent free-marketer, that Medicare’s prospective payment
system for hospitals was adopted, an unprecedented government intrusion in the health
care sector, potentially opening a wedge in the alliance between Republicans and the
medical lobby.
9 But it is Nixon who here emerges as a visionary president, a health care innovator whose
reform principles would be – in some form or other – part and parcel of all health care
reform proposals,  both  Democratic  and  Republican,  for  the  next  three  decades.  The
chapter on Nixon highlights two major initiatives with long-ranging consequences: the
Health  Maintenance  Organization  Act  (the  name  “HMO”  was  forged  by  the  Nixon
Administration), which encouraged the creation of health care networks on the model of
Kaiser  Permanente,  one of  the  first  prepaid  group  practices,  and  the  enrollment  of
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in HMOs. Variations on this model of health care
financing and delivery were the keystone of health reform efforts in the late 80s and the
linchpin of Clinton’s ill-fated plan. They are now firmly entrenched in the U.S. health care
landscape. Even more surprising, Nixon was also the first president to support a detailed
policy proposal aimed at providing universal coverage (the Family Health Insurance Plan
of 1971 and its successor, the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan), to be based on a
combination of public and private financing, through public programs and a requirement
that (for the first  time) employers insure their workers.  Although Nixon’s plan went
nowhere because of Democratic opposition and the Watergate scandal, it was eventually
to be recognized as a missed opportunity by many health policy experts, as well as by Ted
Kennedy, one of its fiercest opponents at the time. Nixon solidified the public/private
structure of the American health care system that two later Democratic presidents, Bill
Clinton and Barack Obama (who also embraced the employer mandate) would recognize
as “the American way.” 
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10 The bills which emerged from committee in 2009 included several features of the Nixon
plan, among them the obligation of employers to contribute to their workers’ insurance,
an expansion of Medicaid, and federal subsidies for the low-income.
11 Less  convincing  is  the  authors’  presentation  of  Reagan’s  determination  to  pass  a
catastrophic health insurance act as a case study of how to win a legislative battle. They
set out to understand why a politician who, at the start of his political career, had warned
Americans of the threat Medicare would present to the very essence of freedom would,
almost  obsessively,  back  a  huge  and  costly  expansion  of  the  program  to  cover
catastrophic  costs,  a  highly  controversial  proposal  opposed by  most  members  of  his
administration. Although they recognize it was intended for political gain during one of
the  most  difficult  periods  of  the  Reagan  presidency,  Morone  and  Blumenthal  also
attribute it to the psychological consequences of the president’s traumatic childhood and
an assassination attempt, as well as to his battle with illness and aging. But if the success
of legislation is measured by its longevity, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 clearly fails to pass the test: the very principle which had allowed the bill to squeak
through Congress (it would pay for itself through higher beneficiary contributions) would
spell its demise a year later, when a backlash against the law and loud protests from the
elderly led to its repeal by Congress.
12 The last chapter of the book, one of the few surveys to date of G.W. Bush’s health care
presidency, sheds light on the political paradox of the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003: it was promoted by a conservative president actively engaged in passing the most
expansive entitlement reform since 1965. While the details of the horse trading over the
bill’s specifics are not new, the authors provide an unexpectedly warm and appreciative
analysis of Bush’s policymaking skills, showing him actively engaged in pushing a popular
bill for political but also personal reasons (among them the traumatic loss of his younger
sister Robin to leukaemia when he was a child), and laying out a blueprint for success:
speed,  flexibility,  leadership.  Bush’s  veto  of  the  State  Children's  Health  Insurance
Program expansion for purely ideological reasons at the end of his second term probably
deserves  more  than the  few lines  they  give  it,  and  this  would  have  mitigated  their
empathetic portrayal of a president who repeatedly denied the urgency of the health
crisis (he once said, “I mean, people have access to health care in America. After all, you
just go to an emergency room.”). Although not the definitive account of Bush's health
care policy, this one nevertheless does justice to his success in enacting a reform that had
eluded the Democrats since 1965.
13 No health care presidency has influenced Barack Obama more than Clinton’s. The much
studied failure of Clinton’s reform effort, promoted by a charismatic president who put
policy  ahead  of  politics,  designed  a  hugely  complex  plan,  but  neglected  Congress,
traumatized a generation of reformers, but also provided a lesson on what not to do. In
their conclusion, Morone and Blumenthal take us back to the rules that remain crucial to
making headway on an issue that will not go away. In late 2009, it looked as if Obama’s
approach was at least partly following the script given in The Heart of Power: he had acted
fast, outlined broad principles, left the details to Congress, had an effective chief of staff,
was ready to build on what existed, and had shown a willingness to compromise. He also
had great communication skills which he had used to convey a sense of urgency to the
nation. For the first time in the history of health reform, bills had been reported out of
committees and a floor debate was being held in Congress.
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14 But where Obama and his advisers sharply diverged from the authors’ recipe for success
was on the role of economists and on competing priorities: coverage or costs. The authors
clearly favor coverage, deploring that, since the 1960s, with the creation of the Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office, the increasing power of
economists has hampered and limited the presidential scope of action. The hard realities
of budget constraints are difficult to reconcile with the grand vision that would be needed
to achieve meaningful reform. Johnson would never have succeeded in passing Medicare
if economists had forecast the financial burden it would create (and did create) for the
federal government. But instead of playing down the warnings of his economic advisors,
Obama has consistently tied coverage to a reduction in spending growth and framed
health  care  reform  as  a  fiscal  imperative  vital  to  the  nation’s  economic  future.  If
eventually  the  prize  eludes  a  president  who  has,  more  than  any  other,  relentlessly
pursued the goal he set for himself and the nation, he might still  secure his place in
history by following one more piece of the authors’ advice: if you lose, define the terms of
the  debate  and  keep  it  alive,  don’t  let  your  opponents  bury  the  issue  for  another
generation – be a Harry Truman, not a Bill Clinton.
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